al-Risalah al-Qudsiyah fi Qawa’id al-‘Aqa’id
(The Jerusalem Epistle on the Foundations of the Articles of Faith)
Also contained in the third section of Ihay Ulum al-Din.

We say-In the name of Allah the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to Allah who distinguished the community of the faithful with the lights of certainty and favoured the people of truth by guiding them to the bulwarks of faith; who saved them from the errors of the unrighteous and the wickedness of the unbelievers, and with His grace led them to follow the example of the chief Apostle; who direct­ed their footsteps in the way of the honoured Com­panions of the Apostle and enabled them to emulate the righteous predecessors, so that they protected them­selves against the dictates of [sheer] reason with the strong cord [of Allah], and against the lives and beliefs of the ancients with the clear beaten track [of the Fathers], combining thereby the products of reason and the ordinances of the traditional Law. Furthermore they found out that mere verbal re­petition of the words “There is no god but Allah; Muhammad is the Apostle of Allah” is of no avail unless they completely understand what fundamental principles the words of the witness involve. They also have known that the two words of the witness, despite their brevity, contain an affirmation of the existence of Allah Himself, His attributes, and His works, as well as an affirmation of the truthfulness of the Apostle. They have also known that faith is founded upon four pillars (sing. rukn) each of which involves ten principles (sing. asl).

The first pillar (rukn) is the knowledge of the essence of Allah and involves ten principles (sing. asl). They are the knowledge that Allah exists and that He is ancient and subsisting; that He is neither sub­stance nor body nor accident; that He is not limited by direction (jihah) nor fixed in location; that He is seen and that He is one.

The second pillar treats of the attributes of Allah and comprises ten principles. They are the knowledge that He is living, knowing, powerful, willing, posses­sed of hearing, seeing, and speaking; that He is removed from being a substratum for originated pro­perties or a locus of phenomena; and that His words, knowledge and will are ancient and eternal.

The third pillar pertains to the works of Allah and involves ten principles. They are that men’s actions are created and willed by Allah and acquired by men; that Allah has been gracious to create and to invent; that He is free to impose unbearable obligations and to punish the innocent, while taking into considera­tion that which is salutary (al-aslah) is not obligatory upon Him; that there is nothing obligatory except by Law; that the sending of prophets is possible and the prophecy of our Prophet Muhammad is true, being confirmed by miracles.

The fourth pillar is on the things accepted on authority (sam’iyat) and involves ten principles. They are the affirmation of the day of resurrection and the day of judgment, the inquisition [of the dead by] Munkar and Nakir, the torment of the grave, the balance, the bridge, the creation of Paradise and Hell, the nature of the imamate, that the excellence of the Companions is in accordance with the chronological order, the qualifications of the imamate, and that even though piety and knowledge are not possible to obtain [in the incumbent], his imamate is considered legitimate and binding.

The first among the pillars of belief is the know­ledge of the essence of Allah and that He is one and it involves ten principles.

The first principle is the knowledge of the exis­tence of Allah. The first light which should be used for illumination and the first thing to be followed on the road of admonition are the instructions of the Qur’an, since no explanation is better than that of Allah. Thus He said, 

“Have We not made the Earth a couch? And the Mountains its tent-stakes? We have created you of two sexes, and ordained you sleep for rest, the night as a mantle, and the day for gaining livelihood. We built above you seven solid heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp; and we sent down waters in abundance from the rain-clouds, that we might bring forth by it corn and herbs, and gardens thick with trees.” (78:6-16) 

And again, “Assuredly in the creation of the Heaven and of the Earth; and in the alternation of night and day; and in the ships which pass through the sea with what is useful to man; and in the rain which Allah sendeth down from Heaven, giving life by it to the earth after its death, and by scattering over it all kinds of cattle; and in the change of the winds, and in the clouds that are made to do service between the Heaven and the Earth; are signs for those who understand.” (2:165) 

He also said, “See ye not how Allah has created the seven heavens one over the other? And he has placed therein the moon as a light, and has placed there the sun as a torch; and Allah has caused you to spring forth from the earth like a plant; hereafter He will turn you back into it again, and will bring you forth anew.” (71:14-17) 

And again, “What think ye? The germ of life-is it ye who created them? or we their creator? Is it we who have decreed that death should be among you; yet are we not thereby hindered from replacing you with others, your likes, or from producing you again in a form which ye know not. Ye have known the first creation: will ye not then reflect ? What think ye? That which ye saw-. Is it ye who cause its upgrowth, or do we cause it. to spring forth? If we pleased we could so make your harvest dry and brittle that ye would ever marvel (and say), `Truly we have been at loss, yet we are forbidden harvest.’ What think ye of the water ye drink? Is it ye who send it down from the clouds, or send we it down? Brackish could we make is, if we pleased. Will ye not then be thankful? What think ye? The fire which ye obtain by friction-is it ye who rear its tree, or do we rear it? It is we who have made it a memorial and a benefit to the wayfarers of the destitute .” (51:58-72) 

Anyone with the least traces of brain in his head will, upon reflecting upon the import of these verses and examining the wonders of Allah’s handiwork, in Heaven and on earth as well as the beauties of nature in animal and plant, realizes that this wonderful [universe] with its consummate order requires a creator to direct it and a maker to govern it and watch it over. Human nature, in tact, testifies that it is subject to the will of Allah and governed in accordance with His law. For this reason Allah said, “Is there any doubt concerning Allah, maker of the Heavens and of the Earth? (14:11)

The prophets were, therefore, sent in order to call men to monotheism, that they may say, “There is no god but Allah.” They were not, however, commanded to say, We have a god and the world has -another,” because such a thing is inborn in their minds from the time of their birth. For this reason Allah said, “If thou ask them who hath created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly reply ‘Allah’.” (31:24) And again, “Set thou thy face then, as a true convert (Hanif), towards the faith which Allah has made, the native [religion] whereon Allah constituted man.” (30:29) 

Therefore there is inhuman nature and the testimonies of the Qur’an what will render the task of citing proofs unnecessary. Never­theless, by way of preparation and following the example of the learned theologians, we say:

One of the accepted axioms of the mind is that an originated phenomenon cannot come into existence without a cause. Since the world is an originated phenomenon, it cannot, come into existence without a cause. That originated phenomena cannot come into existence without a cause, is obvious. For every originated phenomenon belongs to a certain definite time the precedence or the subsequence of which may be assumed. Its being definite in time and distinct from what preceded it and what succeeded it, will naturally require One who renders things definite [in time]. As to one saying that the world is an origina­ted phenomenon, its proof is found is the fact that bodies are not independent of motion and rest. Both states are originated phenomena; and whatever is not independent of originated things is itself origi­nated. The proof comprises three assertions of claims.

The first is that bodies are not independent of motion and rest. This is readily understood and requires neither meditation nor thinking, for he who conceives of a body in neither the kinetic state nor the static state is both ignorant and foolish.

The second assertion is our saying that both motion and rest are originated phenomena, the proof of which is found in the alternation and in the ap­pearance of the one after the other is gone. This is true of all bodies, those that have been seen as well as those that have not been seen. For there is not a static object the potential motion of which is not required by the mind, and there is no moving object the potential rest of which is not required by the mind. The novel (tari’) is originated because of its emergence and the anterior (sabiq), because of its extinction (‘adam), since if its eternity (qidam) were established its extinction would have become impossible, as we shall show and prove in establishing the subsistence (baqa’) of the Maker.

The third assertion is our statement that whatever is not independent of originated things is itself origi­nated. Its proof lies in the fact that if it were not so, then there would be, before every originated pheno­menon, other originated phenomena which have no beginning; and unless these originated phenomena come to nought in their entirety, the turn for the present originated phenomena to come into being im­mediately would never arrive. But it is impossible for that which has no end to come to nought. Furthermore if the celestial spheres have revolutions, the numbers of which have no end, it is inevitable that their numbers be either odd or even, or both odd and even, or neither odd nor even. But it is impossible that their numbers be both odd and even at the same time, or neither odd nor even for this would be a combination of both the negative and the affirmative, since in the affirmation of the one is the negation of the other, and in the negation of the one is the affirma­tion of the other.

Furthermore they cannot possibly be even because the even number becomes odd with the addition of one; and how could that which has no end be wanting one? Nor can they possibly be odd because the odd number becomes even with the addition of one; and how could it be wanting one when its number has no end? (Again they cannot possibly be neither odd nor even for this will mean that they have an end). Therefore the conclusion is that the world is not in­dependent of originated phenomena, and that which is not independent of originated phenomena is itself originated. And when its being an originated phenomena has been established, its need for an originator becomes axiomatic.

The second principle is the knowledge that Allah is ancient (qadim) from eternity (azali). He has no beginning, but He is the beginning of everything and before anything living or dead. The proof of this is found in supposing that if Allah were originated and not ancient, He would have been in need of an origi­nator Himself. In turn His originator would also need an originator and so on to infinity. And that which goes on and on endlessly will never reach an ancient originator which is the first cause. This is the required thing which we have called the Maker of the world and its Creator and Fashioner.

The third principle is the knowledge that Allah, besides being without beginning, is also everlasting without end. He is the first and the last, the visible and the invisible, since that of which the eternity is established its coming to an end is impossible. Its proof lies in the realization that if it came to nought it is inevitable that it should come to nought either by itself or through an opposing annihilating agency. And if it were possible for a thing, which is conceived of as self subsisting, to come to nought, it will be possible for a thing, which is conceived of as self­ annihilating, to come into being. And just as the sudden emergence (tarayan) of existence requires a cause (sabab), so does the emergence of extinction require a cause. That it will come to nought through an opposing annihilating agency is false, because if that annihilating agency were ancient (qadim), existence side by side with it would be inconceivable. But we have learnt in the two previous principles of the exis­tence and eternity of Allah. How then did He exist in eternity with His opposite? If, however, the oppos­ing annihilating agency were an originated pheno­menon, its existence from eternity would be impossible because for the originated phenomenon to oppose the ancient and destroy its existence is less likely than the ancient to oppose the originated and prevent its existence. In fact prevention (daf `) is easier than destruction while the ancient is stronger and more pre-eminent than the originated.

The fourth principle is that Allah is not a substance which can be isolated. Rather He transcends every­thing which resembles isolation. The proof of this lies in the fact that every substance which is definite (mutahayyiz), is limited by its own place and is inevitably either quiescent in it or moving away from it. Therefore it is not independent of motion or quiescence. But both these are originated, and that which is not independent of originated phenomena is itself originated.

If an ancient definite substance were conceivable the eternity of the substances of the world would have been reasonable. And if a person should use the term substance [for Allah] and not mean thereby a definite substance, he would be mistaken [95] as far as the use of the term is concerned, not as far as the meaning for which he had used it.

The fifth principle is that Allah is not a body (jism) composed of different substances, since the body is that which is composed of substances. When His being a substance limited by place is refuted, His being a body is also refuted, because every body is limited by place and is composed of substances. But it is impossible for the substance to be free from division, composition, motion, quiescence, form, and quantity, all of which are characteristic of originated phenomena. And if it were possible to believe that the Maker of the world is a body, it would also be possible to believe in the Divinity of the sun and the moon as well as other heavenly bodies. If, therefore, one should dare and call Allah a body but not mean thereby a composition of substances, he would be wrong as far as the name is concerned, but not in negating the idea of body.

The sixth principle is the knowledge that Allah is not an accident (`arad) subsisting in a body or existing in a substratum; because an accident is that which exists in a body. But every body is inevitably originated and as such its originator exists before it. How then could [Allah] exist in a body when He has existent in eternity alone, with no other besides Himself, and then originated the bodies and the accidents after Himself. [Again how could He exist in a body] when He is a knowing, and able, and willing Creator as shall be discussed later. It is impossible for these attributes to exist in accidents. On the contrary they are impossible except in a self­-existing and self-sufficient being. The conclusion derived from these principles is that [Allah] is a self­-existing being, neither substance, nor body, nor accident; that the whole world is made of substances, accidents, and bodies, and consequently He resembles nothing and nothing resembles Him. He is the living, the subsisting, there is none like unto Him. For how could the created resemble its creator, the ordained he who ordained it, and the fashioned, he who fash­ioned it. All bodies and accidents were created and made by Him; hence it is impossible that they be like unto Him or [in any way] resemble Him.

The seventh principle is the knowledge that Allah is removed from being limited by any direction because a direction is either above or below, right or left, before or behind. All these He had created and originated through the creation of man whom he made with two extremities, the one rests on the earth and comprises his feet, while the opposite extremity is his head. Consequently the term above was originated to indicate the direction of the head and the term below, the direction of the feet. This is true even of the ant which creeps on the ceiling with the result that the directions, in relation to it, are reversed-what we consider above is to it below, and what we consider below is to it above. Similarly man was created with two hands, the one usually stronger than the other. The term right was there­fore originated to indicate the direction of the stronger hand and the term left to indicate the opposite direction. Consequently the right hand side is called the right and the opposite direction thereof is called the left. Man was also created with two [other] directions from one of which he sees and toward which he moves. Consequently the term before was originated to designate the direction toward which he moves, while the term behind was originated to designate the opposition.

Therefore the directions are originated through the creation of man; and had he not been created along these lines, but rather created round like a sphere, these directions would never have existed. How then could Allah have been limited by any direction in eternity when every direction is originated. Or how could He have become limited by any direction when He never had any direction above Him when He created man; for that will mean that He has a head, since above designates the direction above the head. But Allah is too exalted [above His creatures] to have a head [like their heads]. Again how could He have become limited by any direction when He never had any direction below Him when he created man; for that will mean that He has feet, since below designates the direction below the feet. But Allah is too exalted [above His creatures] to have feet [like their feet]. All this is impossible [to imagine] in the mind. For whatever the mind conceives- is definite is so far as it is limited by place, in the same way as substances are limited, or by substances, in the same way as accidents are. But the impossibility of His being a substance or an accident has been established; consequently His being limited by direction becomes impossible.

If therefore anything else is meant by the term direction other than these two meanings then the usage will be wrong in terminology and signification; because if Allah were above the world He would be opposite to it, and everything which is opposite to a body is either equal to it in size, or smaller or larger. All this implies measurement which necessarily requires an object or measurement. But Allah the One Creator and Ruler of the world is too exalted above such things.

As to the raising of hands heavenward at the time of petition it is because Heaven is the direction of supplication and implies a description of the one to whom the supplications are offered, such as majesty and grandeur, employing thereby the direction of height to represent the quality of glory and exaltation. For Allah is above in all dominion and power.

The eighth principle is that Allah is seated upon the throne in the sense which He willed by that state of equilibrium-a state which is not inconsistent with the quality of grandeur and to which the symptoms of origination and annihilation do not permeate. It is exactly what has been meant by the ascension to Heaven in the Qur’an when Allah said, “Then He ascended to Heaven and it was but smoke.” (41:10) This is only through dominion and power, as the poet said,

Bishr has gained dominion over al-‘Iraq,

With neither sword nor shedding of blood.

Thus were the people of truth (ahl al-haqq) compelled to pursue such a figurative and allegorical interpreta­tion just as the esoterics (ahl al batin) were compelled to interpret the words of Allah, “And wherever ye are, He is with you.” (57:4) This has been taken, by agreement, to mean thorough comprehension and knowledge just as the words of the Prophet, “The heart of the believer lies between two of the fingers of this Merciful [Allah]”, have been taken to mean might and power, while his words, “The Black Stone is the right hand of Allah in the earth,” have been taken to mean veneration and honour, because if they were taken literally, the result would have been impossible. Similarly the sitting of Allah upon the throne, if it were left to mean fixity of location and stability, would necessitate that He who is seated upon the throne be a body in contact with the throne, and be either equal to it in size, or larger or smaller. But all this is im­possible, and what leads to the impossible is itself impossible.

The ninth principle is that Allah, although removed from form and quantity and unlimited by directions and climes, is nevertheless seen with the eyes in the hereafter, the everlasting abode. For He said, “On that day shall faces beam with light, outlooking towards their Lord.” (75:22-33 ) But He cannot be seen in this world according to His words, “No vision taketh Him, but He taketh in all vision”, (6:103) and according to His words in His conversation with Moses saying, “Thou shalt not see Me.” (7:139) Would that I knew how the Mu’tazilites knew the attributes of Allah that Moses himself did not know; or how Moses asked to see Allah (7:139) when seeing Him was impossible. Ignorance is more likely to be rampant among heretics and sec­tarians than among the prophets.

The acceptance of the verse [which speaks] of seeing [Allah] (75:22-33) literally [is justified] because it does not lead to anything impossible. For sight (ru’yah) is a kind of revelation and knowledge, although it is more complete and clearer than knowledge. And if it is possible to know Allah without reference to dis­tance or direction (jihah) is also possible to see Him with reference to distance or direction. And just as it is possible for Allah to see men without confronta­tion, it is possible for men to see Him without con­frontation; and just as it is possible to know Him without modality or form, it is possible to see Him likewise.

The tenth principle is the knowledge that Allah is one without any associate, single without any like. He is separate in creating and innovating. He is alone in bringing into existence and inventing. There are none like Him to rival or equal Him, and none op­posite Him to contest or contend with Him. The proof of this is found in the words of Allah when He said, “Had there been in either [Heaven or earth] gods besides Allah both surely would have gone to ruin.” (21:22) This will be readily illustrated [by the fact] that had there been two gods and the first of them willed a certain thing, the second, if he were under compulsion to aid the first, would be a subordinate and impotent being rather than an almighty god; and if the second were able to contradict and oppose the first, he would be a powerful and dominating being while the first would be weak and impotent rather than an almighty god.

The Second Pillar Concerning the Attributes of Allah, Involving Ten Principles.

The first principle is the knowledge that the Maker of the world is almighty and that, in His words, “He hath power over all things,” (5:120) He is truthful, be­cause the world, is perfect in its making and orderly in its composition. For he who would see a garment of silk, fine in its weave and texture, symmetrical in its embroidery and ornamentation, and would imagine that it was woven by a dead man that has no life, or by a helpless man that has no power, would be completely lacking in intellect and utterly foolish and ignorant.

The second principle is the knowledge that Allah is omniscient knowing all things and comprehending all things; nothing in Heaven or on earth is ever hid from His knowledge. He is truthful when He says, “And He knoweth all things.” (2:27) Furthermore evidence of His truthfulness is found in His words when He said, “What? Shall He not know who hath created? For He is the Subtle, the Cognizant.” (77:14) He has led you, through His creation, to arrive at the knowledge that you cannot doubt the evidence which this intricate and orderly creation, even in insignificant and meagre things, offers to the knowledge of the Maker of how to bring order and how to arrange. And what Allah Himself said is the last word in guidance and in revealing knowledge.

The third principle is the knowledge that Allah is living, because he whose knowledge and power are established, his being possessed of life will, of neces­sity, become established. If it is possible to conceive of the existence of an able, knowing, doing and ruling being yet lifeless, it will be possible to doubt the life of animals, despite their movements, as well as the life of all craftsmen and artisans, all of which is utter ignorance and error.

The fourth principle is the knowledge that Allah is willing. He wills all His works and nothing exists which does not depend upon, and proceed from His will. He is the Creator, the Restorer, the Doer of whatsoever He wills. And how could He not be a willer when, in everything which has proceeded from Him, He could have willed its opposite and wher­ever there is no opposite He could have caused the same thing to proceed from Himself before or after the time in which it has proceeded. His power is equal to coping with both opposites and both times in the same way. Therefore, it is necessary that there should be a will which directs His power to one or the other possible thing. And if knowledge would, in specifying the thing known, render the will needless, so that it could be said that a thing has come into being at a time when its existence had al­ready been known, it would be possible for know­ledge to render power needless, so that it could be said that a thing has come into being without [the instrumentality of] power, but simply because its existence had already been known.

The fifth principle is the knowledge that Allah is hearing and seeing. Neither the cogitations of the innermost heart nor the secret thoughts and reflections are hid from His sight; the sound of the creeping of the black ant upon the solid rock in the darkest night is not beyond His hearing. And how could He not see and hear when seeing and hearing are [attributes of] perfection not of defect? Could the created be more perfect than the creator, the thing made more magnificent and more complete than the maker? [97] Or how could they ever be equal, no matter how much He might diminish in perfection while His creation and handiwork increase therein? And again how could the argument of Abraham against his father, who ignorantly and erroneously worshipped idols, be sound? Abraham addressed his father saying, “Why dost thou worship that which neither seeth nor heareth nor availeth thee aught?” (19:42) But if these defects which characterized the idols of his father characterized his god as well, his argument would have been invalid and his evidence worthless, and the words of Allah, “This is Our argument which We furnished Abraham against His people,” (11:83) would have been false. And just at is has been possible for the mind to conceive of His being a doer, although He has none of the physical senses, and knowing, although He has neither heart nor brain, so it is possible to conceive of Him as seeing, although He has no eyeballs, and hearing, although He has no ears, for all cases are the same.

The sixth principle is that Allah speaks with a speech which is a self-existing attribute. It is neither a sound nor a letter; it does not resemble the speech of other beings, just as His existence does not re­semble theirs. In reality genuine speech is the speech of the soul although sounds were built into words merely as symbols, just as gestures and signals are often used to represent the same thing. How then has this fact not been known by a group of ignorant people while it has been known by ignorant poets. Said their spokesman :

“Genuine speech is that of the heart
Our words are its outward expression.”

As to him whose intellect does neither deter nor res­train him from saying that his tongue is an originated thing, but what originates in it by means of his origi­nated power is ancient, you have no reason to expect that he will ever be sane again, and, therefore, shun all discussion with him. Similarly pay no attention to him who does not understand that the ancient (qadim) is that thing before which nothing existed. (Thus in the words “bism-Allah’.” the b precedes the s and con­sequently the s cannot be ancient). For Allah has a secret [reason] for leading some men astray; “And whom Allah causeth to err, none shall guide.” (13:33) As to him who deems it improbable that Moses could have, in this world, heard a speech which was neither sound nor phone, let him deny that in the hereafter he could see a being who has neither body nor colour. But if it has been possible to conceive of seeing that which has no colour, or body, or size or quantity, while until now nothing else has been seen, the same thing would be possible in the case of hearing, just as it has been in the case of seeing.

And if it has been possible to conceive of Allah as having one knowledge, which is the knowledge of all existent things, it would also be possible to conceive of Him as having one attribute, which is a speech comprising all that He has represented with words. And if it has been possible to conceive of the existence of the Seven Heavens, and Paradise and Hell, written all on a small piece of paper and preserved in a minute part of the heart, and seen with a part of the eyeball not exceeding the size of a lentil seed, without the Heavens and Earth, Paradise and Hell actually existing in the eyeball, or the heart, or the paper, it would also be possible to conceive of the speech of Allah as being read with tongues, preserved in the hearts, and written in books, without the actual existence of that speech in these things. For if the very speech [ of Allah ] should actually exist on the leaves of a book, Allah Himself, through the writing of His name on these leaves, would exist actually thereon. Similarly the very fire of Hell, through the writing of its name on the leaves, would exist actually thereon and [ the leaves ] would be consumed.

The seventh principle is that the self existing speech [of Allah], as well as His other attributes, is ancient from eternity, since it is impossible that He be a substratum for originated phenomena and subject to change. On the contrary His attributes demand the same external nature which His essence demands. Change does not overtake Him and mishaps do not befall Him. Nay, He does not cease, in His eternal nature, to be described with the commendable attri­butes, and in His everlasting nature, to be far removed from change. For whatever is a substratum for originated phenomena is not free there from, and whatever is not free from originated phenomena is itself originated. The description of bodies with the epithet of origination was established because of the fact that they are subject to change and variation in properties. How, then, could their Creator share with them [ the property of ] accepting change.

We conclude from this that the speech of Allah is ancient from eternity and self-existing. Only the sounds which represent it are originated.. For just as it is possible to conceive that a child’s desire for learning and his wish for it are existent in the per­sonality of the father before the child is born-so that when he is born and attains maturity, having been given by Allah [a predilection for that] knowledge which is related to the father’s desire, he becomes bound by that same desire which existed in the per­sonality of his father and persisted until he has acquired the knowledge, related to it-it is likewise possible to conceive that the divine command, which the words “Take off thy shoes” (20:12) represent, has existed in the personality of Allah [from the beginning], and that these words were addressed to Moses after he was born, having been given by Allah [the predilection for] their knowledge and an ability to hear that ancient speech [of Allah].

The eighth principle is that His knowledge is ancient. He has not ceased to know Himself and His attributes, as well as everything which He creates. Everything which He creates is not novel to Him, rather it comes into being with His eternal knowledge. Thus if we were  given foreknowledge of the coming of Zayd at sunrise, and that foreknowledge persisted until the sun had risen, then the coming of Zayd at sunrise would have been known to us through that foreknowledge without any necessity for its renewal. This is, then, how the eternal nature-of the knowledge of Allah should be understood.

The ninth principle is that His will is ancient. In its eternal nature it governs the origination of phenomena in their appointed times in accordance with the eternal foreknowledge [of Allah]. For if His will were originated [and not ancient], it would have become a substratum for originated phenomena. Furthermore if the will of Allah should happen in other than Himself, He would not be the willer of it, just as you would not yourself execute an action which is not in yourself. No matter what hypothesis you may assume, its presence requires another will, and like­wise [98] the other will requires a third, and so on to infinity. And if it were possible for a will to come into being without [another] will, it would be possible for the world to come into being without a will.

The tenth principle is that Allah is living pos­sessing life, powerful possessing might, willing possessing a will, a speaker with the ability to speak, a bearer who can hear, and seeing possessing sight. He has the qualities of these ancient attributes. To speak of a knower but without knowledge is like speaking of one who is wealthy but without wealth, or of knowledge without a knower, or a knower without something known. For knowledge, the knower, and that which is known are inseparable just as murder, the murdered, and the murderer are in­separable. And just as it is impossible to conceive of a murderer without murder and one murdered, or of one murdered without a murderer and murder, it is impossible to conceive of a knower without know­ledge, and of knowledge without something known, and of something known without a knower. These three are inseparable and the one is inconceivable without the other. Whoever would deem it possible that a knower should exist independently of knowledge, he would have to deem it possible that a knower could exist independently of that which is known, and that knowledge could exist in dependently of a knower, since there is no difference between these qualities.

The Third Pillar Concerning the Knowledge of the Works of Allah, Involving Ten Principles.

The first principle is the knowledge that every originated phenomenon in the world is of His make, creation, and invention. There is no other creator of it besides Him, and there is no innovator of it except Him. He created men and made them, and He brought into being their freedom (qudrah) and actions (sing. harakah). All the works of His servants are created [by Him] and for Him, and are connected with His power, confirming thereby His words when He said, “[There is no Allah but He], the creator of all things,” (11:102) and “When Allah hath created you, and what ye make.” (37:94) and, “Be your converse hidden or open, He truly knoweth the inmost recesses of your hearts. What! Shall He not know whom He hath created, when He is the subtle, the cognizant ?” (67:13-14) He commanded His servants to be careful in their words, works and secret thoughts and intentions, because He knows the orientation of their works, having arrived at this knowledge through [the act of] creation. And how could He not be a creator of the works of man when His power is complete and free of any impotence. Futhermore His power is con­nected with the actions of the bodies of men. These actions are similar to one another and the connexion of the power of Allah with them is essential. What then would prevent its connexion in the case of some actions and would not prevent it in the case of others, when all are similar? For how could the animal be capable of invention by itself? The spider and the bee as well as the other animals product fine works which amaze the minds. But how could they have invented these things alone without the Lord of Lords, when actually they are not aware of the bene­fits they produce? Let all creatures be abased, for Allah, the Lord of Heaven and Earth, is the sole ruler of the visible and the invisible worlds.

The second principle is the fact that Allah, being the sole inventor of the actions of His servants, does not prevent them from doing voluntary (magdurah) actions by way of acquisition, for Allah has created will (qudrah) as well as the willed (magdur), choice as ‘veil as the chosen. Will is a quality, with regards to man and a creation of Allah rather than an acquisi­tion (kasb); whereas actions are a creation of Allah and an acquired quality of man. They were created voluntary through His will which is one of His attri­butes. Furthermore they are related to another quality which is called freedom (qudrah). Conse­quently in this relation, they are called an acquisition. And how could they be the result of complete compulsion (jabr) when the difference between the voluntary actions and the involuntary (daruri) reflexes is instinctively comprehended by man? Or how could they be a creation of man when he does not know the different parts of acquired (muktasabah) actions and their numbers? Thus when the two extreme positions are disproved, [namely the position that actions are the result of compulsion and the position that they are the result of volition], there remains nothing except the middle-road position which asserts that they are voluntary through the will of Allah by invention and through the will of the servant by another connexion which is expressed by the term acquisition (iktisab). The connexion between the will and the willed need not necessarily be one of invention only, since the will of Allah in eternity was connected with the world although the world was not yet invented, and at the time of inven­tion the connexion is of a different nature. Hence it is evident that the will is not limited by the necessity that the willed should obtain.

The third principle is that the works of the servant, although they are his acquisition (kasb), are nevertheless willed by Allah. Neither a twinkling of an eye nor a stray thought of a heart ever occur, either in the visible or the invisible world except through His decree and will. He is the source of good and evil, benefit and harm, belief [Islam] and un­belief, knowledge and ignorance, success and failure, orthodoxy, and heresy, obedience and disobedience, monotheism and polytheism. There is none that re­scinds His commands, none that supplements His decrees. He leads astray whom He wishes and guides whom He wishes. “He shall not be asked for his doing, but they shall be asked.” (21:23) This is attested in tradition by the words which enjoy the catholic consent of all the faithful, namely, “What He wills is and what He wills not is not,” as well as the words of Allah, “That had He pleased, Allah would have certainly guided all men aright;” (13:30) and again, “Had we pleased we had certainly given to every soul its guidance.” (32:13) As to the evidence for it from reason [ we know ] that if Allah does neither like nor will sins and crimes, they must be in accordance with the will of the enemy, the devil (Iblis), who is the enemy of Allah, and con­sequently what takes place in accordance with the will of the enemy will be greater than what takes place in accordance with the will of Allah. How on earth would a Muslim deem it possible that the authority of the most powerful Allah, He of the majesty and honour, be reduced to a state [ so weak ] that if the authority of a village chieftain were reduced to it, he would scorn and adjure it, since if the enemy of the village chieftain can achieve [99] in the village itself more than the chieftain himself, the latter would abjure his rank and resign his office? But his prevails among men, and according to the innovators, its prevalence is contrary to the will of Allah. This would be the limit in weakness and impotence. Allah, the Lord of Lords is high exalted above the blasphemous words of ‘the transgressors.

Furthermore when it becomes evident that the works of men are, in relation to Allah, created, it follows that they are also, in the same way, willed by Him. If it should then be asked, “How does Allah forbid what He has willed and enjoin what He does not will?” we would say that the question is not that of will (iradah). Therefore if a master strikes his slave and is reprimanded by the sultan, he justifies his action by the rebellion of the slave against him. But the sultan disbelieves him. So he attempts to prove his contention by ordering the slave to do some­thing which the slave would refuse in the presence of the sultan. Therefore he tells the slave to saddle a mount. Now the master orders the slave to do something the fulfilment of which he did not really desire. If he had not given his order, he would not have been able to justify himself; and if had really desired its fulfilment he would have desired destruc­tion for himself, which thing is impossible.

The fourth principle is the knowledge that Allah is generous in creating and inventing and gracious in imposing obligations upon men. Neither creation nor imposing obligations were necessary for Him although the Mu’tazilites hold that these were neces­sary for the welfare of men. But this is impossible since He is the sole cause (mujib), the only being to enjoin and to forbid. How then can He be subject to any necessity or exposed to any need or petition.

Necessary (wajib) means one of two things : First an act in the neglect of which is harm, either remote as is the case when we say that it is necessary for man to obey Allah if they want to escape torment by fire in the hereafter, or immediate as is the case when we say that it is necessary for him who is thirsty to drink lest he dies. Secondly, it means anything the non­existence of which would lead to an impossibility. Thus it is said that the existence of that which is known is necessary (wajib) since its non-existence will lead to an impossibility, namely knowledge becoming ignorance.

If the adversary, by saying that the act of creation is necessary for Allah, should mean the first significa­tion, he would expose Allah to harm. If he should mean the second signification, he would then be a Muslim, since when knowledge of thing obtains, its existence will be inevitable. But if he should mean a third signification, that thing is unintelligible. As to his statement that [creation and imposing obligational are necessary for the welfare of men, it is worthless since if no harm would overtake Allah for neglecting the welfare of men, the assertion that [creation and imposing obligation] are necessary, as far as Allah is concerned, is meaningless. Furthermore, the welfare of men demands that Allah should create them in Paradise; to create them in the world of misery and to expose them to sin, lay them open to the dangers of punishment, and to the terrors of resurrection and the day of judgment, spell no bliss in the opinion of the intelligent.

The fifth principle is that, contrary to the position of the Mu’tazilites, Allah is free to impose on men obligations which are beyond their power to fulfill, For if this were not contingent, it would be impossible for men to ask Allah to spare them that burden. But as a matter of fact they have beseeched Allah to spare them that burden when they said “O our Lord! Lay not on us that for which we have no strength.” (2:286) Furthermore Allah has informed His Prophet that Abu­-Jahl would not believe Him, nevertheless Allah com­manded the Prophet to command Abu-Jahl to believe in all the words of Allah. But among the words of Allah were those that Abu-Jahl would not believe Him. How then would he believe Him by not believing Him? The existence of such a thing is absolutely impossible.

The sixth principle is that, contrary to the position which the Mu’tazilites hold, Allah is free to inflict pain on men and to torment them, without their having previously committed any offence, and without the necessity of compensating them with future rewards. For He has freedom of action among His subjects and its inconceivable that His subjects would oppose His freedom therein. Tyranny is dispensing with the possessions of others without their permis­sion. But this is impossible in the case of Allah, be­cause He does not confront possessions belonging to others besides. Himself whereby His dispensing with these possessions could be tyrannous.

The existence of such a thing proves its contin­gency. Thus the slaughter of animals- an infliction of pain on them, and the various kinds of torture which man imposes upon them have not been preceded by any offence. If it should be said that Allah will raise them from the dead and will reward them according to the amount of pain which they suffered, and that such action is necessary, and, therefore, incumbent upon Allah to perform, we would say that anyone who would claim that it is incumbent upon Allah to bring every ant which was killed under the feet and every bug which was crushed between, the fingers back to life, so that He might reward them for the pains which they suffered, would violate the dictates of the Law and reason, since He would regard resurrection add reward necessary and therefore in­cumbent upon Allah. If he means thereby that Allah will suffer some harm through its neglect, then it is impossible; and if he means something else, we have already said that it will be intelligent whenever it does not conform to [any of] the [two] meanings of the term necessary (wajib) mentioned above.

The seventh principle is that Allah does with His servants whatever He wishes and does not have to take into consideration that which is salutary (al-aslah) for His servants, because of what we have already mentioned regarding the fact that there is nothing necessary and, therefore, incumbent upon Allah. In fact it is not reasonable to think of necessity in con­nexion with Allah. “He shall not be asked for His doing, but they shall be asked.” (21:23) I wonder what answer would the Mu’tazilites give when, in connexion with his statement that it is incumbent upon Allah to do what is salutary and good, we place before Him the following [hypothetical] problem: It is supposed that in the hereafter an argument takes place between two persons, a child and an adult, both of whom died Muslims. Now, according to the Mu’tazilites, Allah exalts the rank of the adult and gives him preference over the child, because the former toiled and laboured in acts of worship after he attained maturity. In fact this is incumbent upon Allah according to the Mu’tazilites. Suppose then that the child says, “O my Lord I Why hast thou exalted his rank above mine?” And Allah answers, “Because he hath attained maturity and hath laboured in acts of worship.” Thereupon the child rejoins, “But Lord, it is thou who hast caused me to die a child. Thou shouldst have prolonged my life until I attained maturity; then I would have laboured in Thy worship. But thou, O Lord, hast deviated from justice by favouring him with long life. Lord! Why hast thou so favoured him?” Allah would then reply, “Because I knew that if thou hadst lived to attain maturity, thou wouldst have committed the sins of polytheism and disobedience. Hence it was salutary for thee to die a child.” Such will the apology of the Mu’tazilite be for Allah. But then the unbelie­vers will cry up from the midst of Hell-fire saying “O Lord! Hast thou not known that if we had lived to attain maturity we should have committed the sin of polytheism? Why then hast thou not caused us to die in childhood before we could sin? We should have been content to enjoy in Heaven a lesser rank than that of the Muslim child.” [100] What kind of answer could be given for this? In the face of this situation, is it not imperative to conclude that divine matters, in view of their majesty, transcend the evalua­tion and judgment of the followers of the Mu’tazilite school?

If it should be said that since Allah can consider that which is salutary for men but instead he inflicts upon them all manner of torment, His action is un­desirable and unworthy of wisdom, we should then say that the undesirable is that which does not pro­mote the satisfaction of one’s desire. But a thing may be undesirable to one person and desirable to the other if it disagrees with the desire of the one and promotes that of the other. Thus a family would deem the murder of their child undersirable but their enemies would welcome it. Hence if that which does not promote the satisfaction of the desire of Allah is what is meant by the word undesirable, then it is impossible, because Allah has no desire and, therefore, it is impossible to conceive of anything undesirable proceeding from Him, just as it is impossible to con­ceive of Allah being tyrannous, because it is impossible to conceive of Him acting freely with the possessions of others, [since He does not confront possessions be­longing to others besides Himself]. But if that which does not promote the desire of some other than Allah is what is meant by the word undesirable, then why did you say that it was impossible for Him? Is it not merely wishful thinking, disproved by what we have postulated in the debate of the adult and the child and the plea of the unbelievers from the midst of Hell-fire? Furthermore the wise is he who knows the realities of things and capable of harnessing them in accordance with his will. It is here where the consideration of that which is salutary is impera­tive. And as to the wise among us, he takes into consideration that which is salutary as far as he him­self is concerned, in order to gain therewith praise in this world and reward in the hereafter, or to prevent some evil from befalling him-all of which are impossible in the case of Allah.

The eighth principle is that the knowledge of Allah and obedience to Him are obligatory upon men, not, as the Mu’tazilites say, on account of reason, but on account of the ordinance of Allah and His Law. For if reason renders obedience obligatory, it does so either for nor purpose, which thing is impossible, or for some purpose or desire. This must refer either to Allah, which thing is impossible since Allah is free of all desires and wants [in fact belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience, are, the same in relation to Allah], or to the desire of the creature, which is also impossible, since the creature has no desire at the time, but rather he is worried by reason and is deterred from his desires because of it; and he has no desire except reward or punishment in the hereafter. But how could it be known that Allah rewards man for obedience and disobedience and does not punish him for them when both, in relation to Him, are the same. Furthermore He has no inclination to the one or to the other and is not characterized by the one or the other. The knowledge of how to distinguish between them was arrived at through the Law; while he who arrives at it through drawing an analogy between the creator and the creature errs, as the creature distin­guishes between gratitude and ingratitude on the basis of the amount of joy, gladness, and pleasure which he derives from the one or the other.

If it should be said that if study and knowledge are not rendered obligatory except through the Law, which does not become fixed and defined unless the person who is required to fulfil its obligations studies and examines it, and if that person should say to the Prophet that reason does not place upon him any such obligation, and, therefore, he is not going to pursue the study of the Law despite the fact that it becomes fixed and defined only through such study, with the result that the Prophet is silenced, we would then say that this argument is the same as that of the person who, on being warned by another that there is a wild lion standing behind him, and that unless he runs away the beast will devour him, and that he can ascertain that the, warning is true if he will only look behind, says to the one who warned him that the truth of the warning can be established only if he looks behind him, yet he is not going to do so unless the truth of the warning is first established. This will reveal the foolishness of the man and will accomplish nothing besides exposing him to the danger of being devoured. It will not, however, cause the warner any harm. The same is true of the Prophet who says, “Beware, for death is lurking behind you and further beyond wild lions and consuming fire await you. If ye do not take heed for yourselves and admit my truthfulness[50] by acknowledging my miracle, ye will. surely perish. He who will take notice will realize the dangers, take the necessary precautions, and will consequently be saved but he who will not take notice and persists in his stubbornness will die and perish. But I shall suffer no harm even though all men may perish, because my duty is confined to warning.”

The Law declared the existence of the wild lions beyond death, while reason aids in understanding the words of the Prophet and in realizing that what he foretells is possible, and nature urges that precautions be taken against injury and harm. A thing is necessary because its neglect causes injury and harm; while is reason that which renders a thing necessary because it makes known the impending harm. But reason in itself does not lead to the knowledge that when a person follows his appetite he will expose himself to harm after death.

This then is the meaning of both the Law and reason as well as their part in determining that which is necessary. For had it not been for the fear of punishment for the neglect of things enjoined, neces­sity would not have been established, since the term necessary would be meaningless if no harm in the hereafter were consequent upon its, neglect in this world.

The ninth principle is that sending prophets is not impossible. This is contrary to the Brahmans who say there is no use in sending prophets since reason renders it unnecessary. [This is false] because reason does not guide men to works which lead to salvation in the hereafter, just as it does not guide them to discover medicines which are useful in the health. Therefore the need of men for prophets in just like their need for physicians. The integrity of the physician is known through experience white the truth­fulness of the principle is known through miracles.

The tenth principle is that Allah sent Muhammad as the last of the prophets and as an abrogator of all previous Laws before him; the laws of the Jews and the Christians and the Sabians;[51] He upheld him with unmistakable miracles and wonderful signs such as the splitting of the moon,[52] the praise of the pebbles,[53] [101] and causing the mute animal to speak,[54] as well as water flowing from between his fingers[55] and the unmistakable sign of the glorious Qur’an with which he challenged the Arabs.[56] For the Arabs, in their struggle with the Prophet, did everything to check mate him, but despite their distinguished ability and excel­lence in eloquence and rhetoric, they were not able to oppose him with anything like the Qur’an, because it was not within the power of human beings, [in their writings], to combine the succinctness of the phrases of the Qur’an and the smoothness of its style (not^­withstanding the richness of the Qur’an in narratives of early history and the fact that the Prophet himself was unlettered (ummi and unfamiliar with books) with the prediction of unknown fixture events the subse­quent to occurrence of which established the truthfulness of the Prophet. Examples of this are found in the words of Allah when He said, “Ye shall surely enter the sacred Mosque, if Allah will, in full security, having your heads shaved and your hair cut;” (48:27) and again, “Alit, Lam, Mim. The Romans[57] have been defeated in a land hard by; but after their defeat, they over­throw their foes in a few years.” (30:1-3)

The reason why a miracle attests the truthfulness of apostles is because everything which human beings cannot do must be the work of Allah. Whatever is linked by the Prophet with a challenge enjoys the same position as that to which Allah says “You are right.” This is like the case of the person who, stand­ing before the king announces to the subjects that he is the king’s messenger, and in order to prove that he is right asks the king to stand upon his throne and sit down three times contrary to his usual practice. The king obliges and the subjects know, beyond the shadow of doubt, that the king’s action takes the place of his saying “You are right.”